Key Facts
- Full Spectrum of Counter-Drone Tech: Russia has deployed a wide array of anti-drone systems – from powerful electronic jammers and radar complexes to rapid-fire guns, missiles, and even laser beams – to counter the surge of UAV threats theguardian.com reuters.com. This includes truck-mounted electronic warfare (EW) units, rooftop missile launchers in Moscow, portable “drone guns,” and experimental high-energy lasers.
- Electronic Warfare Lead Role: Specialized EW systems like Repellent-1 and Silok automatically detect drone control signals and jam them, disrupting UAVs mid-flight en.wikipedia.org ukrainetoday.org. Newer systems are significantly more effective – for example, the networked CRAB complex reportedly neutralizes 70–80% of targeted drones (vs. ~30% for older Silok jammers) by combining multi-band jamming and drone signal interception bulgarianmilitary.com bulgarianmilitary.com.
- Air Defenses Adapted for Drones: Russia’s point-defense missile systems like Pantsir-S1 and Tor have been positioned around critical sites (even on downtown Moscow rooftops) to shoot down drones theguardian.com militaeraktuell.at. An upgraded Pantsir variant can carry up to 48 mini-missiles specifically optimized to engage drone swarms defense.info defense.info. Older anti-aircraft guns (e.g. rapid 30mm cannons) are also used to blast low-flying UAVs when within range.
- Frontline Force Protection: In response to Ukrainian first-person-view (FPV) kamikaze drones, Russia is fielding personal anti-drone devices. Surikat-O/P, a 2.75 kg wearable jammer, lets soldiers detect drones ~1 km out and jam them ~300 m away, functioning like an “electronic flak jacket” on the battlefield rostec.ru rostec.ru. Tanks and armored vehicles are being fitted with Volnorez jamming modules – a lightweight 13 kg system that can sever a drone’s control link and force it to fail or land before striking armyrecognition.com armyrecognition.com.
- New Tech & Hybrid Systems: Several state-of-the-art counter-UAV systems have emerged in 2024–2025. The SERP-VS6D combines a 360° RF detector with automatic jamming on six channels, proven effective against swarm attacks rostec.ru rostec.ru. The Lesochek EW system (briefcase-sized) now not only blocks radio-triggered bombs but also jams satellite navigation on commercial drones rostec.ru rostec.ru. Russia is even testing laser weapons – in mid-2025 it conducted large-scale trials of new anti-drone lasers, aiming to integrate them into a “unified air defense” after they successfully destroyed test UAVs reuters.com reuters.com.
- Civilian & Domestic Use: Anti-drone defenses are no longer just military – by 2025, an estimated 60–80% of major civilian industrial enterprises in Russia have installed UAV protection equipment tadviser.com. This ranges from radio-frequency jammers guarding power plants and oil refineries to special interceptor drones like the net-tossing Volk-18 “Wolf-18” (developed by Almaz-Antey) intended to snare rogue drones around airports and public events en.topwar.ru en.topwar.ru. Police and security services regularly deploy man-portable jammers at sensitive sites, and mass GPS spoofing around the Kremlin has long been used to keep hobby drones at bay.
- Defending Moscow’s Skies: After a spate of Ukrainian drone strikes on Russian soil, Moscow’s air defense has been massively reinforced. The capital is now encircled by over 50 new air-defense positions as of 2025 militaeraktuell.at. These include layered rings of S-400 and S-300 long-range SAMs, newer S-350 and S-500 systems, and numerous Pantsir-S1 short-range air defense units forming a “drone dome” around the city militaeraktuell.at militaeraktuell.at. Many Pantsirs are elevated on high towers or building tops to improve low-altitude radar coverage against low-flying drones militaeraktuell.at militaeraktuell.at. Electronic countermeasures like the Pole-21 system are also dispersed on cell towers to jam GPS signals and confuse incoming drones defense.info defense.info.
- Battlefield Results Mixed: Russia’s frantic counter-drone efforts have yielded better protection against some threats – for instance, by late 2024 Russian electronic defenses were reportedly intercepting 85–90% of small UAVs on certain fronts defense.info defense.info. However, performance varies. Ukrainian operators adapted tactics (frequency-hopping signals, autonomous modes, etc.) that exploited weaknesses in older jammers like the Silok, leading to several being destroyed by the very drones they failed to stop ukrainetoday.org ukrainetoday.org. Analysts noted the Silok “lacks the sensitivity to detect a drone and the power to jam it… it’s just not very good,” especially under combat conditions ukrainetoday.org. This cat-and-mouse dynamic has pushed Russia to accelerate new counter-drone innovations even as Ukrainian strikes continue.
The Rising Drone Threat and Russia’s Response
Unmanned aerial vehicles – from tiny quadcopters to long-range suicide drones – have exploded onto the battlefield in the Russia-Ukraine war, and Russia itself is now under sustained attack from the sky. Ukrainian forces have made drones a cornerstone of their operations, using them for everything from frontline reconnaissance and guided artillery strikes to audacious long-range attacks on airbases, oil depots, and even downtown Moscow. The past two years have seen Ukrainian drones repeatedly penetrate Russian defenses and strike high-value targets deep inside Russia reuters.com. This relentless threat has spurred an urgent, all-fronts effort by Russia to deploy countermeasures – essentially a crash program to shield troops and cities from prying eyes and bomb drops overhead.
Moscow’s strategy has been to throw every imaginable technology at the problem, building a multi-layered “anti-drone shield.” In President Putin’s words, Russia is now working to create a “universal air defence system” to counter modern air threats (namely drones) across the board reuters.com. In practice, this means reinforcing traditional air defenses and adding new capabilities: short-range air defense units have been beefed up around key sites, electronic warfare units have proliferated at all levels, and R&D on futuristic anti-drone weapons (from laser guns to interceptor drones) has kicked into high gear. “It’s good to begin planning in advance instead of after the first strikes,” a pro-Kremlin military blogger noted, as domestic drone attacks went from improbable to inevitable in 2023 theguardian.com theguardian.com. Below, we delve into the full spectrum of Russia’s counter-drone arsenal – its components, deployments, and how well they’re actually working.
Electronic Warfare Systems: Jamming and Taking Over Drones
Electronic warfare has emerged as Russia’s first line of defense against drones. By scrambling the radio links and GPS signals that UAVs depend on, EW systems can disable drones without firing a shot – an attractive proposition given the sheer volume of hostile drones and the cost of intercepting each with missiles. Over the past decade, Russia had invested heavily in EW, fielding what was (on paper) one of the world’s most formidable arrays of jammers. However, Ukraine’s innovative use of cheap commercial drones in 2022 initially exposed gaps in Russia’s EW coverage and coordination defense.info defense.info. Since then, Moscow has rapidly adapted, deploying new anti-UAV electronic warfare platforms and pushing EW units down to the tactical level to counter “drones everywhere” on the modern battlefield defense.info defense.info.
Heavy Truck-Mounted Jamming Complexes: One class of Russian EW systems is designed for long-range drone detection and jamming from heavy vehicles. A prime example is Repellent-1, a 20-ton truck-based complex introduced in 2016 for counter-UAV missions en.wikipedia.org en.wikipedia.org. Repellent-1’s mast-mounted sensors can pick up the control signals of miniature drones over 35 km away, after which it attempts to jam the drone’s communications and navigation at distances up to ~2.5 km en.wikipedia.org. It essentially acts as an electronic “force field”: detecting incoming UAVs at long standoff ranges, then frying their data links as they come closer. The system’s big antennas and dish emitters are typically mounted on an 8×8 truck (MAZ or KAMAZ chassis) with an armored, NBC-protected cabin en.wikipedia.org en.wikipedia.org. Russia deployed Repellent-1 to conflict zones like Donbas and Syria in the late 2010s, but its effectiveness proved limited by range – it could monitor vast airspace, yet only actually stop drones in a small radius around the vehicle. Newer models or successors (sometimes dubbed “Repellent-Patrol” in media) are rumored to be in development to extend the jamming range.
Another notable heavy system is the 1L269 Krasukha family – not originally designed for small drones, but very relevant. The Krasukha-2 and -4 are powerful multifunction EW stations on 4-axle trucks, mainly intended to blind radar surveillance platforms (like AWACS planes or spy satellites) en.wikipedia.org en.wikipedia.org. However, Krasukha units have reportedly been used to jam the GPS and radio links of larger drones as well. In Syria, U.S. sources noted Krasukha and related systems were blocking small American surveillance drones’ GPS receivers, and even caused a Turkish Bayraktar TB2 to crash by severing its control link en.wikipedia.org en.wikipedia.org. In the Ukraine war, a Krasukha-4 was deployed near Kyiv early on – only to be abandoned and captured by Ukrainians in 2022, providing Western analysts a treasure trove of intel on this high-end jammer en.wikipedia.org bulgarianmilitary.com. With a range measured in hundreds of kilometers for radar jamming, Krasukha is overkill for a quadcopter, but it exemplifies Russia’s philosophy: deny the enemy any use of the electromagnetic spectrum above your troops. It has even been speculated Krasukha can disrupt low-orbit satellites and cause permanent damage to electronics with its powerful emissions en.wikipedia.org. As of 2023, Russia was exporting Krasukha and a related “Sapphire” EW system to allies, and even supplying some to Iran en.wikipedia.org en.wikipedia.org – indicating confidence in these systems’ capabilities.
Tactical and Mid-Range Jammers: To actually cover the front lines and near rear, Russia relies on lighter, more numerous EW units. One workhorse is the R-330Zh “Zhitel” jammer (and the newer R-330M1P Diabazol), which target UAV control frequencies and GPS bands out to a few kilometers; these were seen in Ukraine as early as 2014. More specialized is the Silok series – Silok-01 appeared around 2018 as a dedicated anti-UAV jammer for ground troops ukrainetoday.org. A Silok system comprises directional antennas (on a tripod or vehicle) plus a control module that automatically scans for UAV radio links. According to Russian exercises, a single Silok can detect and jam up to 10 drones at once, creating a protected bubble roughly 4 km (2.5 mi) in radius ukrainetoday.org ukrainetoday.org. In theory, it’s a “set and forget” device: once turned on, it listens for the telltale signals of common drone controllers (Wi-Fi bands, RC frequencies, etc.) and when it finds a match, blasts noise on that channel to sever the connection. Silok units saw heavy use in Ukraine – and heavy losses. Ukrainian forces hunted them down with loitering munitions and even small quadcopters dropping grenades, often outmaneuvering the Silok’s jamming by switching frequencies or using autonomous drone modes. As Ukraine’s military dryly put it, “as it turns out, such [Russian EW] equipment is effective only at Russian training grounds” – implying that on the chaotic real battlefield, Siloks often couldn’t cope ukrainetoday.org ukrainetoday.org. Several Silok-01s were destroyed or even captured intact (one was overrun by Ukraine’s 128th Mountain Brigade in late 2022 ukrainetoday.org), giving Kyiv valuable insight into its workings. This may be one reason Russia developed Silok-02, an improved model that now forms part of larger systems like the CRAB (more on that shortly) bulgarianmilitary.com bulgarianmilitary.com.
A major element of Russia’s drone countermeasures – especially against GPS-guided drones or munitions – is the Pole-21 electronic countermeasures network. Unlike a single device, Pole-21 is a distributed jamming system: dozens of small jammer modules are mounted on cell towers, radio masts, and rooftops to blanket wide areas with GPS interference defense.info wesodonnell.com. Rather than one big transmitter, Pole-21 creates a constellation of emitters that can cover an entire city or base. In essence, it creates a “GPS denial dome” so that incoming drones cannot navigate accurately. Pole-21 nodes reportedly output 20–30 W each and can disrupt GPS, GLONASS, Galileo, and BeiDou signals in a 25 km radius per node defense.info. Russia ringed critical bases in Syria with Pole-21 and has since deployed it around Moscow and other strategic sites (often noticeable when civilian GPS apps start acting wonky in those areas). In one instance, Russian forces set up a Pole-21 array in occupied southern Ukraine – only for Ukraine to precisely blow it up with a GPS-guided HIMARS strike forbes.com. The irony was not lost: the Russian jammer meant to thwart GPS-guided weapons was itself targeted by GPS, suggesting it either wasn’t active or wasn’t effective enough forbes.com. Still, Pole-21 remains a core part of Russia’s defensive toolkit, forcing hostile drones to switch to less-precise guidance or be jammed into losing their way odin.tradoc.army.mil.
Next-Generation Systems (2024–25): Experiencing both the strengths and limitations of its EW gear in Ukraine, Russia has fast-tracked new anti-drone electronic systems recently. One headline-grabber is the aforementioned “CRAB” system – a state-of-the-art integrated EW complex that was so new, Ukrainians didn’t even know it existed until they captured one in a daring raid in spring 2025 bulgarianmilitary.com bulgarianmilitary.com. CRAB (likely a codename or acronym) was deployed with Russia’s 49th Army in Kherson to combat Ukraine’s dense FPV drone attacks bulgarianmilitary.com. Unlike earlier standalone jammers, CRAB is built as a networked, multi-layer system: it links several components – long-range detectors, high-precision receivers, powerful jammers (including Silok-02 units) – and even coordinates with other assets like reconnaissance drones bulgarianmilitary.com bulgarianmilitary.com. According to internal documents (leaked via Intelligence Online), CRAB can locate over 95% of drones entering its sector and neutralize their signals about 70–80% of the time, a huge jump from prior systems bulgarianmilitary.com bulgarianmilitary.com. It employs directional antennas and software-defined radios (HackRF modules) to actually catch the video feeds of FPV drones, essentially eavesdropping on what enemy drone pilots see bulgarianmilitary.com bulgarianmilitary.com. Russian operators can use this to back-trace the drone’s location or even hijack its feed. CRAB’s jammers cover all common frequencies used by modified commercial drones, and can detect a drone’s control signals 25+ km away, giving early warning and countermeasures activation bulgarianmilitary.com bulgarianmilitary.com. Notably, CRAB is integrated with Russia’s own UAVs (Orlan-10/30, etc.) and comms networks, creating a real-time sensor grid – friendly drones scan for intruders and feed data to CRAB, which in turn guides friendly forces or cueing air defenses bulgarianmilitary.com bulgarianmilitary.com. This aligns with Russia’s push towards network-centric warfare, where systems share targeting data and jam only when needed to reduce interference rostec.ru rostec.ru. The capture of a CRAB unit by Ukraine was a coup; analysts noted it was one of Russia’s most “sophisticated leaps” in EW technology to date, essentially an answer to the swarm of small FPV drones plaguing Russian trenches bulgarianmilitary.com bulgarianmilitary.com.
At the smaller scale, Russian industry has rolled out man-portable and even wearable jammers to protect individual soldiers and vehicles. The Lesochek EW system, unveiled in 2024, is about the size of a briefcase and can be vehicle-mounted or carried in a backpack rostec.ru rostec.ru. It was originally a counter-IED jammer (to defeat radio-triggered roadside bombs), but has been upgraded to suppress drone navigation and control channels as well rostec.ru rostec.ru. Lesochek can output broadband white noise across HF/VHF/UHF bands, effectively blinding both drones and detonation signals in a convoy’s vicinity rostec.ru rostec.ru. Even more novel is Surikat-O/P, a truly wearable anti-drone system that Russian engineers began testing in 2024. Weighing under 3 kg, Surikat consists of two small modules (a detector and a jammer) plus a battery pack that a soldier can strap to his tactical vest rostec.ru rostec.ru. It alerts the soldier if a hostile drone is very close (within 1 km) and then allows him to trigger a focused jamming burst to knock it out at ~300 m distance rostec.ru rostec.ru. The idea is to give every squad a last line of defense against those deadly quadcopters that appear suddenly overhead. “Personnel protection is the essential task on the front line,” said Natalia Kotlyar, a developer at the Vector Institute, adding that such gear “shall become a binding item in an active combat zone along with helmets and bulletproof vests.” rostec.ru. Indeed, Russia envisions mass-producing Surikat devices so that every platoon could have a drone early-warning and jamming capability on the move rostec.ru. The battery life (12 hours sensing, 1.5 hours jamming) and light weight make it feasible for infantry to carry without much burden rostec.ru rostec.ru.
Finally, Russia’s EW lineup wouldn’t be complete without the handheld “anti-drone guns” that have proliferated globally. Several Russian companies produce rifle-like jamming devices that a soldier or police officer can point at a drone to disrupt its radio control, video, and GPS. One of the earliest was REX-1, designed by ZALA Aero (a Kalashnikov subsidiary), which looks like a sci-fi rifle with multiple antennas. Weighing ~4 kg, the REX-1 can jam satellite navigation within a 5 km radius and cut a drone’s connection up to 1 km away, forcing many small drones to either land or lose control armyrecognition.com armyrecognition.com. Its battery runs about 3 hours armyrecognition.com. A more recent model, REX-2, is a compact version for easier carry. Rostec’s Avtomatika Concern (specializing in communications) came out with Pishchal-PRO, billed as “the lightest handheld anti-drone gun on the market” – shaped somewhat like a futuristic crossbow, it weighs under 3 kg. Pishchal (meaning “flintlock”) can jam 11 frequency bands and was demonstrated at Abu Dhabi’s IDEX-2023 expo, where its makers claimed it “is the best portable anti-drone system” in terms of power and range for its size defensemirror.com vpk.name. Another entrant, showcased to President Putin in 2019, is the Garpun-2M portable jammer. Garpun (meaning “harpoon”) is actually worn as a backpack with a shoulder-mounted directional antenna, and it boasts some finesse: it operates on 8 frequency bands and has a tighter beam to avoid interference, with up to 60 minutes of continuous jamming per battery armyrecognition.com armyrecognition.com. Only 500 m range, but it can integrate into a multi-layer defense network by relaying target info to others armyrecognition.com. And not to be forgotten: the “Stupor” electromagnetic rifle – a chunky, square-barreled anti-drone gun unveiled by the Russian Ministry of Defense, first fielded around 2017–2019 armyrecognition.com. Stupor (the name implies “to numb”) uses directed RF pulses to knock out drone controls. Russian forces in Ukraine have been photographed with these various devices, reinforcing that jamming is a core tactic from top to bottom of Russia’s anti-UAV strategy.
Kinetic Interceptors: Guns, Missiles and More
While soft-kill measures (jamming, spoofing) are preferred to gracefully disable drones, sometimes you just have to shoot them down – especially if a drone is already autonomously en route to a target or if it’s too large to jam easily. Russia has therefore repurposed and modified many of its air defense weapons to serve as drone interceptors. The challenge, however, is cost and quantity: using a pricey long-range missile to kill a $5,000 drone is not a winning trade, especially if dozens of drones come at once. Thus, Russia’s kinetic approach has focused on rapid-fire, short-range systems and cheaper interceptors to complement the EW umbrella.
Anti-Aircraft Missiles and Artillery: The staple of point air defense in Russia is the Pantsir-S1 system – a truck-mounted air-defense module that pairs twin 30mm autocannons with 12 ready-to-fire missiles. Originally designed to protect high-value sites from fast aircraft and cruise missiles, Pantsir turned out to be one of Russia’s go-to drone killers as well. It has an on-board radar and electro-optical trackers capable of picking up small UAVs, and its 30mm cannons can spew hundreds of rounds to shred low-flying objects (though actually hitting a tiny drone with gunfire is difficult). In early 2023, images emerged of Pantsir-S1 units being hoisted onto Moscow rooftops – including atop the MoD headquarters and other central buildings – as a last line of defense for the capital theguardian.com theguardian.com. The military acknowledged these short-range AD placements were not only for missiles and aircraft, but also “could be used against smaller targets, such as drones” now that UAVs “have become ubiquitous on the battlefield” theguardian.com theguardian.com. Essentially, Moscow turned its city center into a “fortress” with Pantsir batteries ready to fire at any incoming drone swarm. Outside of Moscow, Pantsirs are deployed widely around strategic bases (e.g. protecting long-range S-400 SAM sites and airports) and in combat zones to guard field headquarters and rear depots. They have had some success – Russian reports claim dozens of Ukrainian drones shot down by Pantsirs – but also notable failures (a few Pantsir units themselves have been destroyed by Ukrainian strikes or loitering munitions when they were caught reloading or looking the wrong way centcomcitadel.com).
To handle smaller drones more efficiently, Russia has developed new missiles and ammo. A modernized Pantsir variant (often called Pantsir-SM or S1M) was showcased with quad-pack launcher tubes for mini-missiles defense.info. Instead of 12 large missiles, it can carry 48 small drone-interceptor missiles, each presumably with just enough range and explosive to take out a UAV cheaply defense.info defense.info. This mirrors approaches by other countries (like the US NASAMS’s proposed AIM-132 dart and others) to avoid “using a cannon to shoot a mosquito.” The exact specs of these mini-missiles are not public, but their presence was noted by defense watchers: “With… up to 48 short-range missiles, the Pantsir air defense system is heavily optimised to neutralise large swarms of hostile drones.” militaeraktuell.at. In the field, even old Soviet guns have been dusted off for drone defense. The ZU-23-2 twin 23mm cannon, a towed anti-aircraft gun from the 1960s, is often seen on trucks or planted around bases as a cheap point-defense against low, slow drones. Its high rate of fire gives a chance to hit low-tech drones (essentially flak). Similarly, Shilka self-propelled AA vehicles (4× 23mm cannons on a tracked chassis) have been spotted near the front, trying to shoot down UAVs that get within 2–2.5 km. These are very short range solutions and mostly a last resort if jammers or missiles fail to stop a drone coming in.
For larger “one-way” attack drones (like the Iranian-made Shahed-136 delta-wing drones that Russia itself uses against Ukraine), Russia can employ its medium-range SAMs such as Tor-M2 or Buk-M2/3. In fact, Ukrainian officials have noted that Russian air defenses down a considerable fraction of Ukrainian long-range drones and missiles – although statistics vary widely, Russia often claims high interception rates. One analysis by a defense think tank suggested that by 2024, Russia’s layered defenses (particularly electronic warfare combined with SAMs) were preventing 85–90% of small and mid-size drones from causing damage, essentially blunting many Ukrainian aerial attacks defense.info defense.info. This likely refers to drones like the UJ-22 or other UAVs Ukraine has sent toward Russian cities, many of which have been intercepted or foiled (though certainly not all, as recurring strikes on airbases and infrastructure show).
Interceptor Drones (“Drone-on-Drone” Defense): A novel and somewhat sci-fi approach is to send drones to catch drones. Russia and Ukraine are both racing to deploy such interceptor UAVs that can autonomously hunt down intruders forbes.com unmannedairspace.info. One Russian project at the forefront is the Volk-18 “Wolf-18” interceptor drone developed by Almaz-Antey (traditionally a missile maker). The Wolf-18 is a small quadcopter drone equipped with an optical sight and an unusual weapon: it carries a set of net-carrying projectiles that can be fired to entangle another drone’s rotors en.topwar.ru en.topwar.ru. In testing, the Wolf-18 proved it could detect and chase down a target drone, launch a net to physically capture or foul it, and if that failed, even ram the target as a last resort en.topwar.ru en.topwar.ru. The net concept is attractive for civilian areas – unlike shooting a drone (and sending debris and bullets flying), a net can neutralize it more safely. Wolf-18 prototypes passed flight trials and “combat” tests by 2021 and were slated for state trials, with developers hinting the first deployments would be to protect civilian airports from intruding drones uasvision.com uasvision.com. In fact, Russian media reported that the net-drone would be used at airports and critical facilities as an anti-UAV guard uasvision.com. The drone is quite small (about 60 cm width, 6 kg weight) with ~30 minutes endurance en.topwar.ru en.topwar.ru. It can work autonomously in a defined patrol zone and only needs an operator’s go-ahead to attack, thanks to an AI-guidance system en.topwar.ru en.topwar.ru. As of 2023–24, Almaz-Antey upgraded Wolf-18 with better sensors and had it successfully intercepting test drones; they indicated series production could begin once government evaluations were complete en.topwar.ru en.topwar.ru. This suggests Wolf-18 or similar intercept drones might already be in limited use, guarding high-profile events or sites where shooting down a drone could be too risky (for example, imagine a rogue drone near an airport runway – a net drone could bring it down without gunfire).
There are reports of other exotic concepts as well. Russian firms have showcased everything from anti-drone UAVs with shotgun shells to drones carrying electronic warfare payloads that can fly toward an enemy drone and jam it at close range. In 2023, one Russian center even claimed to be testing a “24-barrel anti-drone turret” combining a laser dazzler and electronic jammer – essentially a stationary robot that could engage multiple drones (though this sounds largely experimental) facebook.com. Additionally, Russia has signaled interest in loitering munitions as interceptor drones – using a small kamikaze drone to ram into enemy UAVs. It’s a bit like hitting a bullet with a bullet, but against slower drones it might work. On the Ukraine front, some Russian units have tried using their own Lancet strike drones to chase Ukrainian UAVs. This field is evolving fast on both sides.
Directed Energy (Lasers): Finally, Russia has publicly hinted and boasted about directed-energy weapons to counter drones. In May 2022, then Deputy PM Yuri Borisov claimed Russia deployed a new laser called “Zadira” in Ukraine that “incinerated” a drone 5 km away in seconds defensenews.com defensenews.com. This claim was met with skepticism, as no evidence was provided and lasers effective at 5 km are not easy to deploy on a mobile platform. Nevertheless, by 2023–24 Russia did demonstrate some laser-based air defense progress. In mid-2025, the government announced it had conducted large-scale tests of new laser systems against various drones in different weather conditions reuters.com reuters.com. Footage showed a drone being burned up, and officials called the tech “promising,” saying it would move to serial production and be incorporated into Russia’s broader air defense network reuters.com reuters.com. President Putin himself urged accelerated development of these “directed-energy” defenses. One specific system rumored to be in testing is “Posokh” – reported as a laser air-defense prototype used in exercises understandingwar.org. Intriguingly, there are also indications Russia might be leveraging foreign tech: in 2025 a video surfaced (via Telegram channels) suggesting a Chinese-made Silent Hunter 30kW laser had been acquired and deployed by Russian forces laserwars.net laserwars.net. The Silent Hunter is a known Chinese anti-drone laser capable of disabling UAVs at up to 4 km by burning through their airframes or sensors. If Russia has indeed imported one, it underscores how critical counter-drone warfare has become – to the point of quietly sourcing advanced systems abroad despite sanctions. That said, lasers in Russia’s arsenal are likely still auxiliary and experimental. Weather (fog, rain, snow) can degrade them, and their effective range is typically short (1–2 km reliably). But as drone swarms get larger, high-energy lasers offer the allure of limitless “ammunition” (just power) and speed-of-light engagement. We can expect Russia to continue investing in this area, aiming for a future where cheap drones can be zapped out of the sky en masse without expending costly missiles.
Protecting the Homeland: From the Front Lines to Moscow
Russia’s anti-drone strategy isn’t just about military hardware; it’s also about deployment – where and how these systems are used. Broadly, there are three zones of concern: the active warfront in Ukraine, the border regions and strategic facilities (oil depots, airfields, power plants), and major cities like Moscow. Each presents different challenges and has seen a tailored defensive rollout.
Front Line and Battlefield Use: On the front in Ukraine, Russian troops face hundreds of reconnaissance and attack drones daily. Small quadcopters hover to drop grenades into trenches; FPV drones scream toward tanks to explode on impact; larger UAVs spot for artillery. In response, Russia has embedded counter-UAV tactics at every echelon of its forces defense.info defense.info. At the platoon/company level, soldiers now often have drone alert procedures and use portable jammers (like Stupor or newer Surikat) when a threat is near. Camouflage has been adapted – many Russian armored vehicles have been covered with makeshift “birdcage” wire screens and anti-drone netting to detonate or ensnare incoming drones (the so-called “cope cages” or “turtle tanks” approach) defense.info defense.info. Electronic warfare units that used to be kept at brigade or division level are now pushed forward as “trench-level” EW teams, operating those Silok and Lesochek jammers near frontline positions defense.info defense.info. This decentralized approach came after painful lessons in 2022 when centralized EW assets couldn’t react quickly to swarm attacks defense.info defense.info. Now, each combined-arms battalion might have its own anti-drone section. Russia’s military doctrine has “undergone radical transformation under drone pressure,” notes one analysis – moving from top-down, static defenses to distributed, layered defenses that mix kinetic and electronic countermeasures on the ground defense.info defense.info. For instance, a Russian motorized rifle battalion in 2025 might be accompanied by: a couple of Tor-M2 SAM vehicles for shooting down UAVs, a EW truck (like Borisoglebsk-2 or Lever-AV) to jam communications in the area, several Silok or Volnorez units attached to tank companies for immediate drone interference, and snipers or machine-gunners trained to shoot at drones if all else fails. Drones have essentially become the new incoming mortar fire – omnipresent, requiring constant vigilance and quick reactive fire or jamming.
Protecting Bases and Infrastructure: After some embarrassing strikes (like the August 2022 blasts at Saky airbase in Crimea and the Dec 2022 drone attack on Engels bomber base), Russia recognized that rear-area facilities were highly vulnerable to long-range drones. In late 2022 and 2023, they started hardening these sites. Take airbases deep in Russia: Ukraine demonstrated the ability to hit them with improvised long-range UAVs. In response, Russia installed more SAM batteries around key bases and deployed Pantsir-S1 units directly on the tarmac to cover low-altitude approaches. At Engels airbase (500 km from Ukraine), satellite images showed Pantsirs guarding the bomber parking areas after one drone damaged strategic bombers. Oil refineries and fuel depots in border regions now often sport perimeter anti-drone systems – either a Pantsir/Tor for high-speed response or EW systems to jam GPS and control signals. One notable initiative is the widespread installation of counter-UAV gear at civilian industrial sites. By April 2025, an estimated “60% to 80% of civilian industrial enterprises in Russia have already equipped their territories with protection against UAV attacks” szru.gov.ua. This statistic, cited by a Russian tech industry report, shows how seriously even civilian sectors are taking the drone threat. These defenses include things like radar+jammer combos mounted on facility rooftops (for example, a power plant might have a 360° surveillance radar and a directional jammer turret to stop a rogue drone). The Russian government has urged companies in sectors like energy, chemicals, and transportation to invest in such systems, fearing sabotage or terror attacks from drones. Even critical agriculture facilities (like large grain storage or food processing plants) are being outfitted with anti-drone systems in some regions en.iz.ru – indicating that Russia is concerned not just about military drones but also about any UAV that could threaten economic targets or public safety.
A high-profile example of domestic drone defense is Russia’s effort to shield the Crimea Bridge (Kerch Bridge) – a strategic and symbolic asset that Ukraine has targeted with drones and explosives. Russia reportedly deployed boat-detecting radars, EW systems, and layers of SAMs specifically around the bridge. Similarly, in border oblasts like Belgorod, Bryansk, and Kursk (which have seen numerous Ukrainian drone incursions), local authorities have set up improvised “anti-drone squads” and surveillance posts. In Belgorod city, police cars have been spotted carrying anti-drone guns to quickly respond if a quadcopter is reported overhead. Kursk region experienced drones attacking an airfield and an oil terminal; since then, the area bristles with additional short-range AD units and EW interference is frequently observed (GPS disruptions, etc.). The discovery of the Volnorez vehicle-mounted jammer in Kursk (before it was even uncrated) by a Ukrainian commando team shows how Russia was forward-staging advanced countermeasures in high-threat border zones armyrecognition.com armyrecognition.com. Volnorez’s deployment on T-80 tanks in Ukraine – complete with tanks sporting cage armor and this 13 kg jammer – underscores how integral drone defense is to unit survival now armyrecognition.com armyrecognition.com. By emitting interference that breaks any FPV drone’s control link in the final 100–200 m of its approach, Volnorez effectively creates an electronic shield around the tank, causing attacking drones to either crash or harmlessly fizzle out before hitting armyrecognition.com armyrecognition.com. This kind of point-defense jamming is likely being rolled out to more frontline vehicles (reports suggest new T-72B3 and T-90M tanks also are getting drone jammers installed) bulgarianmilitary.com.
The “Drone Dome” Over Moscow: Nowhere has Russia been more determined to prevent drone strikes than its capital city. After a shocking incident in May 2023 – when drones struck several buildings in Moscow – the Kremlin accelerated plans to encircle the metropolis with layered air defenses. By August 2025, over 50 anti-aircraft sites had been established in and around Moscow in an expanded defensive ring militaeraktuell.at. This essentially resurrects the concept of the Soviet-era Moscow Air Defense Zone, but updated for modern threats. According to analysis by Militär Aktuell, new Pantsir-S1 and SAM positions have been sited roughly every 5–7 km in a wide radius 15–50 km from the city center militaeraktuell.at militaeraktuell.at. Lacking hills around flat Moscow, the military resorted to erecting 20-meter tall metal towers and elevated platforms to mount Pantsir systems – giving their surveillance radars a better angle to detect low-flying drones that hug terrain militaeraktuell.at militaeraktuell.at. Some positions are on repurposed high structures (like old landfills or mounds) and even on specially built ramps militaeraktuell.at militaeraktuell.at.
Within the city, as noted, at least three Pantsir-S1 units are permanently stationed on rooftops near the Kremlin: one atop the MoD building by the Moscow River, one on an Interior Ministry building north of Red Square, and one on an education ministry building east of the center militaeraktuell.at militaeraktuell.at. These are highly visible – Muscovites have shared photos of the missile launchers silhouetted on buildings, a jarring sign of the times militaeraktuell.at. The medium- and long-range SAMs form outer layers: open-source counts as of early 2023 suggested at least 24 S-300/S-400 launchers around Moscow, plus newer S-350 Vityaz systems and even the ultra-long-range S-500 Prometheus in limited numbers militaeraktuell.at. Each layer is meant to catch a different category of threat (ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, jets, and drones). However, Moscow’s defense focuses particularly on low, small drones lately – the kind that might slip past big S-400 radars. That’s where the dense Pantsir network and jamming come in.
Electronic defenses have been bolstered in the capital, too. Since 2016, GPS spoofing around the Kremlin has been known to confuse drone navigation (tourists noticed their map apps acting funny near Red Square – likely a peacetime anti-drone measure). After 2023’s incidents, Russian telecom regulators reportedly installed more Pole-21 nodes around Moscow to create a wide GPS jamming umbrella defense.info defense.info. Devices to detect drone radio frequencies have been given to police units; the city even considered enlisting civilian drone hobbyists as volunteer “drone spotters.” Although specifics are secret, one can infer that multiple Ruselectronics EW systems (the maker of SERP, Lesochek, etc.) are deployed to protect Moscow’s airspace electronically. Indeed, Russian officials revealed that by mid-2025 about 80% of key enterprises in Moscow had some anti-drone protection, and all critical government buildings were covered by layered defenses tadviser.com militaeraktuell.at.
Despite these efforts, Ukrainian drones have still sometimes gotten through – highlighting that no system is foolproof. Drones have struck Moscow’s business district in 2023 and 2024, hitting high-rise building facades (with minimal damage but huge symbolic impact). This suggests some low-level gaps remained, or that drones flew in autonomously on waypoints (less susceptible to jamming). It keeps Moscow on edge; as a CEPA analysis put it, “even with new technologies, 100% protection will not be achieved” and Russia’s capital remains not entirely drone-proof cepa.org. The Russian military acknowledges this, but aims for maximum coverage to reduce successful strikes to a minimum. The rapid expansion of Moscow’s defenses – essentially building a modern flak curtain around a 12-million population city in a matter of months – is unprecedented in recent history, and underscores how seriously Russia now treats the drone threat on its own soil.
Effectiveness and Evolving Challenges
How effective are Russia’s anti-drone systems overall? The picture is mixed and constantly changing as “adaptation and counter-adaptation” play out defense.info defense.info. Early in the invasion, Russia was caught off guard by Ukraine’s drone tactics, suffering numerous losses. Since then, it has undoubtedly improved its drone defenses – many Ukrainian drone strikes are now intercepted or fail to hit vital targets. Russian sources often cite high interception rates (for example, claiming nearly all Ukrainian UAVs attacking Crimea in a given week were shot down or jammed). Western analysts have also observed Russia’s interception rate against certain drones has climbed dramatically thanks to layered EW and air defenses defense.info defense.info. The introduction of new systems like CRAB, SERP, and wearable jammers has likely saved lives on the front, making Ukrainian drone attacks less financially sustainable (Ukraine cannot afford to lose dozens of expensive FPV drones for only a few getting through). As one 2025 study noted, Russian forces showed “remarkable tactical learning,” going from “drone warfare laggards in early 2022 to sophisticated practitioners by 2025.” defense.info defense.info Every few months, they’ve fielded a new gadget or revised tactics to counter the latest drone threat – yet, importantly, Russia remains one adaptation cycle behind Ukraine’s innovations defense.info defense.info. Ukraine finds a weak point (say, fiber-optic guided drones immune to jamming, or drones attacking EW units themselves), exploits it, and Russia scrambles to plug that gap with something new. For instance, when Ukraine began using drones with no RF emissions (pre-programmed routes or tethered control), Russian EW was flummoxed, leading Russia to explore fiber-optic drones of its own and more emphasis on kinetic interception defense.info defense.info.
There have been embarrassing episodes for Russia: As described, Silok jammers intended to ground drones instead got hunted by drones. The Ukrainian military gleefully documented cases of tiny quadcopters dropping grenades precisely onto high-tech jammers, taking them out of action ukrainetoday.org ukrainetoday.org. Each time that happened, it was both a tactical success for Ukraine and a propaganda coup (showing a $1000 drone defeating a million-ruble system). The captures of advanced systems like Krasukha-4 and CRAB handed Ukraine (and NATO) insight to develop counter-countermeasures. It’s a vivid demonstration that anti-drone warfare is now as important as drone warfare itself – a see-saw where each side tries to gain a temporary edge.
Russia’s broad approach – combining electronic and kinetic defenses – is considered the correct strategy by military experts. A recent CNAS report noted that counter-drone missions “entail much more than simply air defense” and cannot be left to traditional air defense units alone cnas.org understandingwar.org. Russia’s experience echoes that: they needed the concerted efforts of EW specialists, air defenders, infantry with new gear, and even engineers to fortify positions (with drone nets and cages) to meaningfully reduce the drone threat. The scale of Russia’s response is telling. By mid-2025, they were training up large numbers of “drone hunters” – both human and technological. Factories under Rostec are reportedly running overtime to churn out anti-drone guns, EW devices, and to integrate new counter-UAV features into existing platforms (for example, newer T-90M tanks rolling off the line might come pre-fitted with a small UAV radar and jammer). Rostec officials have been openly talking about the booming demand: “The portfolio of Rostec’s products for countering UAVs” keeps growing, one executive said, emphasizing versatility for both “civilian and military UAVs” and offering systems that can be tailored per customer needs (e.g. a civilian security firm might only want detection and not full jamming) rostec.ru rostec.ru. “One of the main advantages of the Sapsan-Bekas is its versatility… easy to adapt to the needs of customers,” noted Oleg Evtushenko, Rostec’s Executive Director rostec.ru rostec.ru. Indeed, the Sapsan-Bekas mobile system was designed with modular components so it could be sold to energy companies just for drone detection, or to the military with the jamming and radar all included rostec.ru rostec.ru. This highlights how counter-drone tech is now a major industry in Russia.
Ultimately, Russia’s anti-drone arsenal is extensive and growing more sophisticated by the month. It ranges from 8-wheeled electronic “buzzers” that scramble the skies for miles, to shoulder-fired missiles and cannons ready to blast drones out of the air, to ingenious solutions like electronic backpacks and net-casting drones for the most personal layer of defense. The scale and urgency of these deployments cannot be overstated – Russia’s military has effectively had to treat small drones as a new class of menace on par with rockets and artillery, rewriting their manuals and redesigning hardware accordingly. And as they do so, Ukrainian forces adapt again, in a continual cycle. As a result, the battle between drones and anti-drones has become one of the defining contests of the Ukraine war.
One Russian commentator quipped that the conflict is a “drone war” as much as anything, with “the most intensive proving ground for drone warfare” in history prompting an equally intense proving ground for countermeasures defense.info defense.info. Each Russian innovation – be it a new jammer, a new missile, or a laser – is quickly noted and studied by Ukraine, and vice versa. Going forward, we can expect Russia to double down on integration (networking all these systems for better efficiency), automation (using AI to rapidly identify and prioritize drone targets), and cost-swap favorability (developing ever-cheaper interceptors so shooting down a drone is less costly than launching one). The Kremlin’s goal is to make drone attacks futile or at least highly ineffective. As of late 2025, they haven’t achieved an impenetrable shield – drones still occasionally slip through and grab headlines – but they have constructed a formidable multi-layer defense that is undoubtedly saving many assets and lives from the hovering threats above. In the cat-and-mouse game of drone vs. anti-drone, Russia has turned much of its territory into a high-tech defensive web, a “fortress in the sky,” even as the game is far from over.
Sources: Russian Ministry of Defense and state media reports; Rostec and Ruselectronics press releases rostec.ru rostec.ru; independent military analyses and eyewitness accounts ukrainetoday.org defense.info; reporting by Reuters and international outlets reuters.com theguardian.com; expert commentary from Forbes, CSIS, and defense think-tanks ukrainetoday.org defense.info. These sources provide detailed insights into the capabilities and deployments of Russia’s counter-drone systems, as well as real-world performance data from the ongoing conflict.
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